can statutes designed to ameliorate the unfortunate status of illegitmate children at common law, and has been widely copied. 2 Since it is a well-known rule of statutory interpretation that a construction given a statute by the state of its origin is impliedly adopted by the legislature of a state which subsequently itself adopts the statute, the Virginia cases are of quite general interest. The tendency of the times is shown by the increase in the number of such statutes, and greater liberality in their interpretation. Although such statutes are in derogation of the common law they are generally held to be remedial in their nature and are therefore usually construed liberally to accomplish the beneficent purpose for which intended. 3 Since these enactments are frequently a part of the intestate laws of the State (as in Virginia) a strict interpretation would lead to the unfortunate result that the issue of void marriages would be legitimate only for the purpose of inheritance. That this is clearly not the law is shown by the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeals in Virginia has considered this statute for the purposes of determining whether the plaintiffs were "children" within the meaning of a clause in a will devising property to trustees for the use of A and B for their joint lives, and if either should die without children, the whole for the use of the survivor for life. and at his death to the children of the survivor in fee, 4 whether or not the father owed a duty to support such issue, 5 and whether or not the issue of such a marriage are children of the father within the meaning of death-by-wrongful-act statutes. 6 But what is a "void marriage" and what is the distinction between "no marriage" and a "void marriage"? In Virginia four types of marriages have been held void without decree: ( 1) bigamous marriages; 7 (2) marriages between a white person and a colored person; 8 (3) marriages knowingly made to any person who has been lawfully adjudged to be insane, epileptic or feebleminded and duly admitted as a patient or inmate in any State hospital or colony; 9 and, 2. By "at least three States in the Union-Kentucky, Ohio, and Arkan- ( 4) common law marriages. 10 According to some authorities a bigamous ceremonial marriage must have been entered into honestly and in good faith by at least one of the parties for the statute to apply. Otherwise, it is argued, there is no marriage at all-not even a void one.U Yet most (but not all) of the statutes say nothing about the good faith of the parties, and if the statute makes no such requirement a decision insisting on good faith is contrary not only to the letter but to the spirit of the statute which is obviously designed to protect the "innocent and unoffending" offspring. The idea that the crime of bigamy, or even that of miscegenation, can be eliminated by stigmatizing the children of such marriages is simply absurd, for people who are so infatuated with each other that 'they are willing to commit a felony by contracting an illegal marriage \vill not be deterred on the one hand, or encouraged on the other hand, by the thought that possible issue may be illegitimate or legitmate. It just is not "cricket" to punish the children for the crimes of their parents. 12 Fortunately, however, there are a number of decisions which either ignore any question of good faitl1 or expressly repudiate that requirement. 13 For example, in the Virginia case of Goodman v. Goodman 14 a child was born before the marriage of the parents, who subsequently contracted a void bigamous marriage. The father, both before and after the void marriage, recognized the child as his own. Under a statute providing for the legitimation of bastards by recognition and the subsequent intermarriage of their parents,15 it was held that the subsequent marriage need not be a valid marriage, and hence the child born before such void marriage was entitled to inherit from the father to the exclusion of the father's brothers. 16 If the marriage is void because miscegenous 17 there is a sharp conflict of authority as to whether or not the issue are legitimate. 21 in which an Indian man married a Negro woman in Oklahoma where such marriages were absolutely void. It was held (two of mine judges dissenting) that issue of the marriage were legitimate. "In the mind of this simple red man these children were his children." 22 In such cases there is no reasonable doubt as to the usual intentions of the deceased intestate. It is the primary purpose of the intestate laws to carry out that intention-not to defeat it. And since such intention was given effect in Re Atkins, supra, the decision in that case was eminently proper. To allow the intestate's property to go to his collateral relatives under such circumstances is as unnatural as the miscegenous marriage itself. The legitimacy of the issue of common law marriages in States where such marriages are void have been held to be legitimate in States having the statute under discussion. 23 It has been contended that the statute applied only to void ceremonial marriages, but one looks in vain for any such limitation in the statute, and the decisions holding the issue legitimate clearly carry out the intentions of the Legislature in enacting the statute, and are to be commended. 24 One of the commonest cases to arise, however, is that in which parties who know of some impediment to the marriage, and know of the serious 19. At that time miscegenation was punishable by confinement in the penitentiary from two to five years, and bigamy from three to eight years; now miscegenation is from one to five years and bigamy is still from three to eight years. criminal penalty which may attend such a marriage, live together as man and wife without getting married. Here, unfortunately, the cases hold unanimously that meretricious cohabitation is not even a void marriage. Issue are said to be born "clear out of wedlock." "The legislature did not attempt to make concubinage marriage."-2 ;; Now no one contends the marriage is legal, or that the parties are husband and wife. But why do we not have a void common law marriage in these cases? Are the children of such unions to be punished merely because their parents preferred to commit a misdemeanor (e. g., living in adultery), rather than a felony (e. g., bigamy) ? Is not a void common law marriage a void marriage? Should we draw petty distinctions between a void marriage, a voidable marriage, and no marriage at all, to the injury of the issue? It is submitted that where the parties have cohabited as man and wife and there is no reasonable doubt as to the paternity of the issue, then such issue should be held to be legitimated by the statute. This would exclude the case of the issue of promiscuous intercourse, not for the purpose of discouraging such intercourse, or for the purpose of punishing such issue, but because in such cases there is serious doubt as to the identity of the father and, even if the latter be established, it is not clear whether or not the father would presumably wish such issue to be regarded as his children and heirs at law.
A great many involved questions have arisen with reference to such statutes in the realm of conflict of laws. 2 6 Two illustrative cases will suffice for present purposes. In re Bruington's Estate 21 actually held that a child born and domiciled in New Jersey and legitimated there under the New Jersey statute was not a legitimate child entitled to realty of an intestate in New York on the ground that a New Jersey statute could not make the issue of a bigamous marriage legitimate in New York. On the other hand, in the Virginia case of Witlzrow v. Edwards, 28 a child of a bigamous marriage was born in South Carolina where there is no legitimating statute. The parents moved to Virginia. The father was ki1led in an automobile accident and the question arose as to whether or not the child was legitimate and hence a child of the father under the Virginia death-by-wrongfulact statute. 29 The court properly held that the child was entitled to the sum recovered. It repudiated the theory that illegitimacy is a fixed, permanent status. The decision can be supported on three distinct grounds : ( 1) That Virginia as an incident to -its sovereignty has the right to determine the status of its citizens, and under the statute legitimating children of void marriages, ,it is immaterial where the void marriage took place; (2) the statute at the very least is a statute of descent and means that the child is legitimate for the pur- 
